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Interstate Compacts That Are for the Birds:
A Proposal for Reconciling Federal Wetlands
Protection with State Water Rights Through FederalInterstate Compacts*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A sense of time lies thick and heavy on such a place. Yearly since the
ice age {the peat bog] has awakened each spring to the clangor of
cranes. . . . The cranes stand, as it were, upon the sodden pages of
their own history.

* * *

Our ability to perceive quality in nature begins, as in art, with the
pretty. It expands through successive stages of the beautiful to values
as yet uncaptured by language. The quality of cranes lies, I think, in
this higher gamut, as yet beyond the reach of words.
Aldo Leopold 1

In 1850 Congress passed the General Swamp Land Act permitting
states to select and acquire the unclaimed swampland within their
boundaries. 2 Swampland was considered useless and Congress hoped
that by giving it to the states, farmers would drain it and turn it into
valuable farmland. 3 The plan worked too well. As with many early
land disposition schemes, 4 the General Swamp Land Act was subject to

* Copyright ill 1996 by Erik G. Davis. My working title was Section 404: The
Creature from the Federal Lagoon. I also briefly considered calling this Comment simply
Swamp Thing. I ruled both of these titles out, however, because I decided that for state water
rights holders the phrase "federal wetlands protection" was at least as territying as anything
that ever appeared in a Hollywood "B" movie.
I wish to express thanks to Professor Ray Jay Davis who terrified a generation of BYU
law students until his retirement last year. This paper could not have been written without
Professor Davis' insights, experience, and occasional terrorizing.
1. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 102-03 (Ballantine Books 1989)
(1949).
2. General Swamp Land Act, ch. 84, 9 Stat. 519 (1850).
3. Dalana W. Johnson, Saving the Wetlands from Agriculture: An Examination of

Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and the Conservation Provisions of the 1985 and 1990
Farm Bills, 7 J. LAND USE & ENVT'L L. 299, 300 (1992) (citing S. REP. No. 357, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 215-16 (1990)).
4. Squatting on the public lands was so common in early American history that
Congress finally capitulated and legalized the practice in the General Preemption Act, ch. 16,
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rampant abuse and fraud. One land agent for the State of Mississippi
allegedly "judged as swampland all tracts over which a boat could pass
[so he] drove a work animal 'hitched to a canoe across thousands of
acres' of pinelands at fairly high elevations, listed his selections and,
though contested by the Federal government, they were finally patented
to the state. " 5 The government originally intended to give away five to
six million acres, but before the General Swamp Land Act was amended
and finally repealed, more than eighty million acres of purported
swampland had been selected, much of which was ultimately patented to
the states and obtained by wealthy land speculators. 6
In this century Congress has recognized the enormous ecological and
hydrological value of these lands. A change of terminology reflects this
new understanding. What were "swamplands" in the nineteenth century
are now "wetlands." Wetlands are some of the richest and most
biologically diverse ecosystems in nature, 7 but their importance is more
than just ecological. Modern legislation recognizes the important
recreational and aesthetic values that wetlands represent, as well as their
essential role in flood control and water quality management. 8 Unfortu-

5 Stat. 453 (1841). an (unsuccessful) attempt to regulate squatting. GEORGE C. COGGINS ET
AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 80-81 (3d ed. 1993).
Other major land disposition and reclamation schemes subject to abuse included the
Homestead Act, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862); the Graduation Act, ch. 244, 10 Stat. 574 (1854);
the Desert Land Act, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877) (codified as amended at 43 U .S.C. §§ 321334 (1988)); the Kinkaid Act, ch. 1801, 33 Stat. 547 (1904) (repealed 1976); the Enlarged
Homestead Act, ch. 160, 35 Stat. 639 (1909) (repealed 1976); the Pickett Act, ch. 421, 36
Stat. 847 (1910) (repealed 1943); and the Stock-Raising Homestead Act, ch. 9, 39 Stat. 862
(1916) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 299-301 (1988). Most of these were repealed
by the Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784
(1988).
Grants to the railroads were so generous that the land disposition plan came to be known
as "the Great Barbecue." CoGGINS, supra at 97.
5. COGGINS, supra note 4, at 78 (citing PAUL GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW
DEVELOPMENT 328 (1968)).
6. /d.
7. Michael R. Deland, No Net Loss of Wetlands: A Comprehensive Approach, 7 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 1992, at 3; see also DAVID SALVESON, MITIGATING AND
REGULATING DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS, 15 fig. 1.3 (1990).
8. Robert Beck cites what he calls "an exhaustive statement of wetland values" from
an Illinois wetlands protection statute:
(1) reducing flood damages by absorbing, storing and conveying peak flows from
storms;
(2) improving water quality by serving as sedimentation and filtering basins and as
natural biological treatment areas;
(3) providing breeding, nesting, forage and protective habitat for approximately 40
percent of the State's threatened and endangered plants and animals, in addition to
other forms of fish, wildlife, waterfowl and shorebirds;
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nately, support for these values came only after much of the nation's
wetlands had disappeared. In the past 200 years more than half of the
wetlands in the lower forty-eight states have been destroyed. 9 Some
states have lost over eighty percent of their wetlands. 10 Predictably, this
loss of habitat has drastically reduced migratory bird and waterfowl
populations, which by 1989 reached their lowest numbers in recorded
history. 11 While many species inhabit wetlands, waterfowl are often
monitored particularly closely. This is because they are good "indicator
species," species whose vitality-like the canary in the coal mine-is
indicative of the general health of the entire ecosystem.
The federal government, belatedly recognizing the value of what it
gave away 150 years ago, has in recent years developed a policy goal of
"no net loss" of wetlands. 12 Any development projects that reduce the
nation's total wetlands area must be offset by the creation of new
wetlands. 13 Various state and federal regulatory and non-regulatory
schemes manifest this "no net loss" policy. 14 Unfortunately, about

(4) protecting underground water resources and helping to recharge rivers, streams
and local or regional underground water supplies;
(5) serving as recreational areas for hunting, fishing, boating, hiking, bird watching,
photography and other uses;
(6) providing open space and aesthetic values, particularly in rapidly developing areas;
(7) providing unique educational and research opportunities because of their high
diversity of plants and animals, their support for a high incidence of threatened and
endangered species, and their function as a natural buffer for rivers, lakes and
streams;
(8) supplying nutrients in freshwater food cycles and serving as nursery areas and
sanctuaries for young fish; and
(9) helping to protect shorelines from the forces of erosion.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 96 112, 1 9701-2(c), (cited in Robert E. Beck & C. Peter Goplerud III,
Wetlands Preservation, 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 547, 548-49 (Robert E. Beck ed.,
1991)).
9. Beck, supra note 8, at 548-49; see also Johnson, supra note 3, at 299.
10. Deland, supra note 7, at 3.
II. See Beck, supra note 8, at 556 n.53 (citing [Current Developments] Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1433 (1989)).
12. Memorandum of Agreement, 55 Fed. Reg. 9210 (1990) (recording agreement
between the Army Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency to maintain
a policy of "no net loss" of wetlands); North American Wetlands Conservation Act, Pub. L.
No. 101-233, 103 Stat. 1968 (1989) (touted by President Bush as the first step in implementing
a "no net loss" policy); see also Beck, supra note 8, at 548; Deland, supra note 7, at 3.
13. Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 12; see generally Margot Zallen, The
Mitigation Agreement-A Major Development in Wetland Regulation, NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T, Summer 1992, at 19.
14. Recent non-regulatory agricultural incentives, known as the "swampbuster"
provisions, include the Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198,99 Stat. 1566 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 7, 16, 19 and 42 U.S.C. (1988)), and the Food,
Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(104 Stat.) 3359 (Title XIV of the Act codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3822-3824 (1991)) (amending
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three-fourths of the remaining wetlands in the lower forty-eight states are
now privately owned, largely because of the General Swamp Land Act
and similar laws. 15 Converting swampland to farmland typified public
land policy throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
However, with the growing urgency of the wetlands situation, the federal
government has increasingly regulated private wetlands and related water
rights. 16 Not surprisingly, those who own the regulated land or water
rights generally oppose such federal regulation.
The federal government's principal regulatory tool for preserving
wetlands and the focal point of the debate surrounding wetlands
preservation is the Clean Water Act. 17 Section 404 of the Act requires
a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers to discharge any dredge or
fill material in the nation's navigable waters (including wetlands), 18 but
section 404's application is much broader than the words "dredge and fill
permitting" suggest. Much controversy has surrounded the expansion of
federal regulatory jurisdiction over land use under section 404, 19 but this
Comment will deal less with land use conflicts than with water apportionment disputes, which if somewhat less common, are no less divisive.
Many who hold state water rights have been particularly frustrated by the
effect of federal wetlands regulation on interstate compacts.
The Constitution gives states the power to enter into compacts with
other states, subject to the approval of Congress?° Compacts have been
used to settle interstate conflicts throughout our country's history, but
they were not used to resolve water allocation disputes until the early
1920s. 21 The first interstate water compact was approved by Congress
and written into law in 1925. 22 This was the La Plata River Compact,
signed by Colorado and New Mexico. 23 Professor Felix Frankfurter
(later Justice Frankfurter) was so enamored with the idea that he
published an article with James M. Landis that same year in the Yale Law

the Food Security Act of 1985). Other federal legislation has been enacted in the last decade
aimed exclusively at protecting wetlands, especially the Emergency Wetlands Resources Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-645,100 Stat. 3582 (1986), 16 U.S.C. §§ 3951-3956(1991), and the
North American Wetlands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-233, 103 Stat. 1968 (1989).
15. Deland, supra note 7, at 3; see also SALVESON, supra note 7, at 19 fig. 1.5.
16. Deland, supra note 7, at 3-4.
17. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); see Beck, supra note 8, at 557.
18. 33 U .S.C. § 1344 (1988).
19. See, e.g., James W. Sanderson, Section 404: Federal Interference with State and
Local Land Use? 7 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 1992, at 6.
20. U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 10, cl. 3.
21. Douglas L. Grant, Water Apportionment Compacts between the States, 6 WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS 549, 549 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991).
22. !d.
23. La Plata River Compact, 43 Stat. 796 (Jan. 29, 1925).
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Journaf24 in which they enthusiastically praised the notion of interstate

compacts and expressed their hope that the use of such compacts would
soon become general. 25 In the seventy-odd years since Frankfurter and
Landis published their article, this hope has largely been realized as
interstate water compacts have proliferated. There are now at least
twenty-one interstate compacts apportioning the water rights to various
rivers or river systems throughout the United States, and other compacts
governing various aspects of water management. 26
This Comment examines the section 404 permitting process and how
it affects interstate water allocations under interstate compacts. Part I
discusses the section 404 permitting process, including jurisdictional
disputes and the scope of the Clean Water Act. Part II examines
particular water allocation problems that have arisen because of conflicts
between federal wetlands preservation and state and local water laws.
Part III examines how these conflicts affect interstate water allocation.
Finally, Part IV proposes resolutions to these conflicts, concluding that
federal-interstate water compacts are the best solution.
II.

THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS AND THE SECTION 404 PERMITTING
PROGRAM

For [the whooping cranes], the song of the power shovel came near to
being an elegy. The high priests of progress knew nothing of cranes,
and cared less. What is a species more or less among engineers? What
good is an undrained marsh anyhow ?21

Until 1972 the role of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the
"Corps") was limited largely to improving navigation and rendering
technical assistance to states for bridge and dam construction. Any
contact the Corps had with wetlands consisted of simply draining
swamps. In 1972 Congress passed amendments to the National Water
Pollution Control Act which were intended "to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 28
One of these amendments was the addition of section 404, which requires
anyone who wishes to discharge dredged or fill material into the
navigable waters of the United States to first obtain a permit from the

24. Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A
Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685 (1925).
25. Grant, supra note 21, at 552.
26. /d. at 549-51.
27. LEOPOLD, supra note 1, at 107.
28. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988).
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Secretary of the Army through the Corps.Z9 Five years later the 1972
Amendments became the Clean Water Act. 30
Early controversies surrounding section 404 concerned the jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers' permitting program and the definition of
"navigable waters" as used in section 404(a)Y Originally, the Corps was
reluctant to apply the program vigorously and required section 404
permits only on traditionally navigable waters as interpreted under the
River and Harbor Act of 1899, 32 the Corps' original grant of jurisdiction.33 In 1975 environmental groups sued the Secretary of the Army,
forcing the Corps to expand its jurisdiction to include those waters
included generally under the Clean Water Act's statutory definition in
section 502(7). 34 This section defines navigable waters as "waters of the
United States, including the territorial seas. " 35 This broad definition
significantly enlarged the Corps' jurisdiction. In subsequent regulations,
the Corps interpreted "waters" to include wetlands36 and wetlands
adjacent to waters of the United States. 37 As one judge explained, the
new definition put any "moist land adjacent to a creek" under the
permitting jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers. 38 It may appear that
this regulation stretches the definition of "navigable waters of the United
States" beyond all recognition. One should remember, however, that it
traditionally takes very little water to navigate a boat across swamplands
or wetlands in the United States. 39
Further litigation was necessary to define "dredge and fill materi40
al, " "wetlands," and "adjacent wetlands." In the end, the Supreme
Court also defined these terms broadly. 41 In United States v. Riverside

29. !d. at§ 1344(a). The Corps' authority to administer this program is based on the
Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407, a piece of legislation that was discovered and resuscitated by environmental activists in the 1960s and used as a federal pollution control statute until
passage of the Clean Water Act. A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES
§ 9.03[2] (1994).
30. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988); see also SALVESON, supra note 7, at 29 fig 2.1.
31. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1988).
32. !d. at§ 403.
33. Beck, supra note 8, at 558 (citing Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742 (9th
Cir. 1978)).
34. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Calloway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C.
1975).
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1988).
36. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1994).
37. !d. § 328.3(a)(7).
38. United States v. Larkins, 852 F.2d 189, 194 (1988) (Merrit, J., concurring).
39. See supra text accompanying note 5.
40. See, e.g., AvoyellesSportsmen's Leaguev. Alexander, 473 F. Supp. 525 (W.D. La.
1979) (holding that the clearing of vegetation from a periodically inundated area was subject
to a § 404 permit).
41. See Beck, supra note 8, at 559-60.
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Bayview Homes, Inc., the Supreme Court reversed a Sixth Circuit holding
that would have restricted section 404's application to areas frequently
flooded by navigable waters. 42 Instead, the Court determined that
Congress intended to apply the Clean Water Act as broadly as possible
under the Commerce Clause. 43 Consequently, the Court upheld the
Corps' definition of wetlands, which does not require flooding by surface
waters, but only proximity to navigable waters and sufficient saturation
to support typical wetland vegetation. 44 Broad readings of section 404's
statutory language have expanded the Corps of Engineers' already
expansive regulatory power over state water rights and land development
activities. Section 404 provides some exemptions from the permitting
requirements, principally for traditional agriculture and silviculture
activities. 45 These exemptions, however, have been narrowly construed
by the courts. 46
The Corps' section 404 permitting program is subject to federal
environmental regulations, including the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) 47 and the Endangered Species Act (ESA). 48 For example,
42. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985).
43. /d. at 133. The congressional record seems clear on this point. A memorandum
introduced by Congressman Dingell asserting Congress' broad powers under the commerce
clause states:
[T]his new definition clearly encompasses all water bodies including main streams and
their tributaries, for water quality purposes. No longer are the old, narrow definitions
of navigability, as determined by the Corps of Engineers, going to govern matters
covered by this bill. Indeed, the conference report states on page 144: "The
conferees fully intend that the term navigable waters be given the broadest possible
constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency determinations which have been
made or may be made for administrative purposes."
House Consideration of the Report of the Conference Comm., Oct. 4, 1972, S. REP. No. 1,
93 Cong., 1st Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS, 1972, at 250-51 (1973) (Statement of Rep. Dingell, quoted in
TARLOCK, supra note 29, at§ 9.03[2]).
44. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (1994). This section of the Corps' regulations defines
wetlands as "those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a
frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support,
a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands
generally include swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas." /d.
45. 33 U .S.C. § 1344(t)(l)(a) (1988).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Akers, 785 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1986) (requiring a§ 404
permit for a new dike and drainage system to convert former wetlands to agricultural uses); see
also Beck, supra note 8, at 562; DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW 387 (1990); TARLOCK,
supra note 29, at§ 9.06[2][a]; Johnson, supra note 3, at 304-06 n.54.
47. 42 u.s.c. §§ 4321-4370 (1986).
48. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1988). Other federal laws that are incorporated by
implication in § 404 include the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-662
(1988), Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1276 (1988), and the Coastal Zone
Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464(1988). See also FRANK J. TRELEASE & GEORGE
A. GOULD, WATER LAW 759 (4th ed., 1986).
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section 7 of the ESA requires federal agencies to preserve the habitat of
threatened and endangered species. 49 This section was invoked to deny
a permit for dam construction on Wildcat Creek in Colorado because the
diversion would probably leave insufficient water in the Upper Platte
River to protect critical whooping crane habitat far downstream in
Nebraska. 5° Because a permit is required even for purely private dredge
and fill projects in the navigable waters of the United States, 51 section
404 insures a full environmental review of some activities of private
parties not otherwise affected by federal environmentallegislation. 52
Although recent years have seen a "greening" of the Corps of
Engineers, the Corps' mission has historically concerned navigation and
water resource development, not environmental protection.
The
environmental role traditionally belongs to the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), which plays an important part in section 404 administration. Because of the EPA's decidedly environmentalist bent, developers
and their advocates have been disturbed by the EPA's broad powers
under section 404. The legislative history of the Clean Water Act
indicates that the more development-minded House and the more
environmentally-minded Senate compromised to use the EPA as a check
on the Corps' power. 53 Subsections (b) and (c) of section 404 give the
EPA broad powers of oversight to regulate the permitting program,
which is essentially administered by the Corps of Engineers. 54 Under
subsection (b), the Administrator of the EPA promulgates guidelines that
the Corps must follow in issuing section 404 permits. The Clean Water
Act requires these guidelines to be based on criteria set out for ocean
discharges in subsection 403(c), which reflects mostly environmental
concerns. 55 Under subsection 404(c), the EPA has power to review and

49. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536 (1985).
50. Riverside Irr. Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (lOth Cir. 1985).
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988).
52. GETCHES, supra note 46, at 388.
53. Sanderson, supra note 19, at 8.
54. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(b),(c) (1988).
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1343(c) (1988). The criteria to be taken into account include:
(A) the effect of disposal of pollutants on human health or welfare, including but not
limited to plankton, fish, shellfish, wildlife, shorelines, and beaches;
(B) the effect of disposal of pollutants on marine life including the transfer,
concentration, and dispersal of pollutants or their by-products through biological,
physical, and chemical processes; changes in marine ecosystem diversity, productivity, and stability; and species and community population changes;
(C) the effect of disposal of pollutants on esthetic, recreation, and economic values;
(D) the persistence and permanence of the effects of disposal of pollutants;
(E) the effect of the disposal at varying rates, of particular volumes and concentrations
of pollutants;
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veto the Corps' decisions to issue dredge and fill permits. Although the
Corps vigorously contends that EPA vetoes have little effect on its
permitting decisions, 56 some critics claim that the EPA is biased against
development interests and uses its veto power as a "vehicle for driving
the entire Section 404 program from the tail-end of the process. "57
III.

HOW FEDERAL WETLANDS PROTECTION AFFECTS STATE WATER
RIGHTS

The county records may allege that you own this pasture, but the plover
airily rules out such trivia/legalities. He has just flown 4,000 miles to
reassert the title he got from the Indians, and until the young plovers
are a-wing, this pasture is his, and none may trespass without his
protest.

* * *

In farm country, the plover has only two real enemies: the gully and the
drainage ditch. Perhaps we shall one day find that these are our
enemies too. 58
A.

Does Section 404 Actually Affect State Water Rights?

The extent to which section 404 actually affects water allocation
under state water law is the subject of some controversy. Dan Tarlock
has argued that when combined with the Endangered Species Act, the
effect of section 404 on state water diversion and impoundment projects
is so substantial that it creates a de facto federal water right-what he
calls a federal "regulatory property right. " 59 Federal regulatory rights,
to the extent that they are recognized at all today, are acknowledged to
be merely a "conceptual analysis" 60-a convenient way of talking about
the federal government's regulatory power over state water rights. But
in the late 1970s, the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior briefly
asserted the actual existence of federal "non-reserved" water rights

(F) other possible locations and methods of disposal or recycling of pollutants
including land-based alternatives; and
(G) the effect on alternate uses of the oceans, such as mineral exploitation and
scientific study.
56. Lance D. Wood, Section 404: Federal Wetlands Regulation Is Essential, 7 NAT
RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 1992, at 7, 55.
57. William B. Ellis, Section 404(c): Where is the Balance?, 7 NAT RESOURCES &
ENV'T, Summer 1992, at 25, 65.
58. LEOPOLD, supra note 1, at 37-38.
59. A. Dan Tarlock, The Endangered Species Act and Western Water Rights, 20 LAND
& WATER L. REV. I, 1 (1985).
60. !d. at 26.

334

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 10

"arising out of land management functions of the federal agencies. " 61
While the Secretary no longer maintains this position, federal agency
authority over private water rights remains a difficult issue.
Certainly in 1972 when Congress enacted section 404 to amend the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act it did not intend to create a new
federal water right. In fact, Congress did not necessarily intend to affect
water allocation quantities at all; the legislation's primary purpose was to
improve the quality of the nation's waters. 62 If Congress foresaw any
effects on private water rights, these effects must have appeared minor
and incidental. In fact, during the first few years after its passage,
section 404's impact on state and local water law was not fully apparent. 63 It was not until the late 1970s when the EPA had completed its
regulatory guidelines and section 404 began to be used with other
environmental statutes that the new law's use as an environmental
regulatory tool became apparent. 64
There is still debate about whether section 404's effect on state water
rights is more than minimal. 65 Clearly what Frank Trelease argued
regarding federal reserved rights cannot be claimed for the section 404
program. Trelease wrote in 1977 that water resource developers' fears
about federal reserved rights ultimately amounted to little more than
"crying wolf. " 66 But while wetlands regulation and federal reservations

61. Federal Water Rights of the National Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service,
Bureau of Reclamation and Bureau of Land Management, 86 Interior Dec. 553 (1979),(cited
in Lawrence MacDonnell, Federal Interests in Western Water Resources: Conflict and
Accommodation, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 389, 398 (1989)). This statement, known as the
Krulitz opinion, was essentially withdrawn after Secretary Watt came to the Department of the
Interior on the basis of a study issued by the Department of Justice concluding that no federal
water rights exist under FLPMA or the Taylor Grazing Act. Supplement to Solicitor Opinion
No. M-36914 (Federal Water Rights of the National Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service,
Bureau of Reclamation and Bureau of Land Management), 88 Interior Dec. 253 (1981), cited
in MacDonnell, supra at 398. To my knowledge federal regulatory water rights have not been
reasserted since the Krulitz administration.
62. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988); Sanderson, supra note 19, at 6,
8-9.
63. Lawrence MacDonnell remarks that "[m]uch has been written about the many ways
in which water quality regulation could affect the availability of water for consumptive use.
In fact there has been surprisingly little direct conflict along these lines." MacDonnell, supra
note 61, at 400. However, whether "surprisingly little" means that there is in fact little conflict
or simply that the conflicts resulting from § 404's implementation have been somewhat less
catastrophic than anticipated is unclear. In fact, and as MacDonnell points out, it is the indirect
effects of the Clean Water Act, among which he includes the § 404 permitting program, that
have raised problems. /d.
64. See Ellis, supra note 57, at 63.
65. See Sanderson, supra note 19; Wood, supra note 56.
66. Frank J. Trelease, Federal Reserved Rights Since PLLRC, 54 DENVER L.J. 473, 492
(1977). Trelease points out that as far as federal reserved rights go, '"not a single case of
harm has been reported,' that 'for all the outcry ... not one state, not one county, not one
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are similarly benign in some ways-both are typically non-consumptive,
instream uses-wetlands differ from reserved rights in other important
ways. For instance, they are not typically limited to mountainous
upstream areas. But most importantly, unlike federal reserved rights,
section 404 has in fact been invoked to protect wetlands at the expense
of various water development plans. Still, it is clear that the program has
not made development of water and land resources impossible.
Lance Wood, chief counsel on Environmental Law and Regulatory
Programs for the Corps, argues that the section 404 program is typically
deferential and that it interferes with state and local laws only when they
clearly conflict with federal interestsY Of the more than 90,000
projects the Corps reviews each year, only about 500 are denied a section
404 permit. 68 Wood also argues that the EPA's influence over the
Corps permit decisions is slight to non-existent. Since the creation of the
section 404 permitting program in 1972, the EPA had, as of 1992,
exercised its veto power a total of only eleven times, and the Corps
claims that these decisions have had little impact on their permitting
program. 69
On the other hand, critics of the section 404 program claim that
"only the naive would conclude that EPA is not ... intending the [veto]
action to 'drive' the program. " 70 James Sanderson argues that judicial
glosses on section 404 have allowed the EPA to extend the jurisdictional
and theoretical reach of the statute far beyond the simple water quality
goals that Congress intended to address when it originally passed ·the
National Water Pollution Control Act amendments in 1972. 71 Others
complain that the courts and federal agencies have failed to balance
environmental concerns with "social interests" (read "development
interests") in the way that Congress intended when it split the permitting
authority and the veto power between the Corps of Engineers and the

municipality, not one irrigation district, not one corporation, not one individual has come
forward to plead and prove that the United States ... has destroyed any private right."' !d.
at 491 (quoting Hearings on S. 1275 Before the Subcomm. on Irrigation and Reclamation of
the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. 39 (1964) (Statement
of Senator Clifford P. Anderson)). In 1988 John Leshy reconfirmed that what Trelease
recognized in 1977 is still true today, and particularly so in the case of federal wilderness area
reserved rights. For all the concern about federal non-Indian reserved rights the reservation
of such rights has had an extremely minimal effect on state water allocation. John D. Leshy,
Water and Wilderness/Law and Politics, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 389 (1988).
67. Wood, supra note 56, at 10.
68. /d. at 54.
69. /d. at 55.
70. Sanderson, supra note 19, at 9.
71. /d. at 54.
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EPA under section 404(c). 72 William Ellis points out that while EPA
vetoes of Corps permitting decisions are rare (he counts twelve since
1972), 73 this is due more to delays in promulgating EPA regulations
than to any kind of agency restraint. 74 He also notes that "the last five
EPA vetoes have all been public water resource projects, " 75 and
concludes that "EPA's vetoes of these projects plainly reveal its current
domination of both the Corps and the section 404 program. " 76
Congress was aware of the potential for conflict with state water laws
when it passed the Clean Water Act. The issue is addressed explicitly in
section 510(g) of the Act, which recognizes state water rights only to the
extent of creating an exception to them in the Act: "Except as expressly
provided in this chapter, nothing . . . shall . . . be construed as impairing
or in any manner affecting any right of jurisdiction of the States with
respect to the waters ... of such States. " 77
In 1977, legislation known as the Wallop AmendmenC8 was added
to the policy section of the Clean Water Act with the purpose of defusing
tension between state water law and federal regulatory powers under the
Clean Water Act. It states:
It is the policy of Congress that the authority of each State to allocate

quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded,
abrogated, or otherwise impaired by this chapter. It is the further
policy of Congress that nothing in this chapter shall be construed to
supersede or abrogate rights to quantities of water which have been
established by any State. Federal agencies shall co-operate with State
and local agencies to develop comprehensive solutions to prevent,

72. Ellis, supra note 57, at 28.
73. /d. at 64. Wood counts eleven. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. This
inconsistency can be explained by the fact that the Ware Creek Reservoir Project was actually
vetoed twice because of judicial invalidation of the first veto. Ellis, supra note 57, at 64.
74. Ellis, supra note 57, at 62.
75. !d. at 64. Interestingly, four of these vetoes have resulted in litigation: (1) City of
Alma v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 1546 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (contesting EPA veto of lake construction, Lake Alma, Bacon County, Georgia, 54 Fed. Reg. 6749 (Feb. 14, 1989)); (2) James
City County v. EPA, 758 F. Supp. 348 (E.D. Va. 1990) (contesting EPA veto of municipal
water supply project, Ware Creek Reservoir, James City County, Virginia (July 10, 1989), 54
Fed. Reg. 33,608 (Aug. 15, 1989)); (3) Alameda Water & Sanitation District v. Reilly, No.
91-M-2047 (D. Colo. filed Nov. 22, 1991) (contesting EPA veto of a municipal water supply
project, Two Forks Dam and Reservoir, Water supply impoundment, Jefferson County,
Colorado (Nov. 23, 1990), 56 Fed. Reg. 76 (Jan. 2, 1991)); (4) James City County v. EPA,
12 F.3d 1330 (4th Cir. 1993) (On remand, the James City County Project, supra number (2),
was vetoed again by the EPA. Ware Creek Reservoir, James City County, Virginia (March
27, 1992)).
76. Ellis, supra note 57, at 64.
77. 33 U.S.C. § 1370(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
78. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (1988).
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reduce, and eliminate pollution in concert with programs for managing
water resources. 79

Shortly after the passage of this amendment a Corps decision to deny a
section 404 permit for a dam on Wildcat Creek was challenged as, among
other things, a federal intrusion upon state water allocation law, contrary
to the policy statement in section 510(g) of the Clean Water Act. 80 The
Tenth Circuit Court held that as a statement of policy, the Wallop
Amendment "'cannot nullify a clear and specific grant of jurisdiction,
even if the particular grant seems inconsistent with the broadly stated purpose. '" 81
The Ninth Circuit Court reached the same conclusion in United
States v. Akers. 82 In that case the Corps had required a California
farmer to obtain a section 404 permit before cultivating a wetlands area
on his farm, but the permit requirement infringed on the farmer's water
rights under state lawY The court held that "any incidental effect on
Akers' rights to state allocated water from the Pit River is justified
because protection of Big Swamp is the type of legitimate purpose for
which the act was intended. " 84
While encouraging cooperation between federal and state agencies,
the Wallop Amendment, as currently understood by the courts, does not
prevent federal agencies from interfering with state water allocation if the
agency can show a legitimate regulatory purpose for its action.
Another subject of controversy is the extent of EPA control over the
section 404 process. This includes its authority to promulgate the
regulations for the permitting program and its power to veto decisions of

79. /d.; cf THE BOOK OF MORMON, 3 Nephi 11: 28-30:
... And there shall be no disputations among you, as there have hitherto been;
neither shall there be disputations among you concerning the points of my doctrine,
as there have hitherto been.
For verily, verily I say unto you, he that hath the spirit of contention is not of
me [Jesus Christl. but is of the devil, who is the father of contention, and he stirreth
up the hearts of men to contend with anger, one with another.
Behold, this is not my doctrine, to stir up the hearts of men with anger, one
against another; but this is my doctrine, that such things should be done away.
Unfortunately, the policy expressed in the Wallop amendment has fared no better than the
doctrine expressed in Jesus' admonition to the Nephites. The broad language of both has left
loopholes that have been exploited by the truly contentious.
80. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (lOth Cir. 1985).
81. /d. at 513 (quoting Connecticut Light and Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 324
u.s. 515, 527 (1945)).
82. 785 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 107 (1986).
83. /d. at 817.
84. /d. at 821 (citing statements of Senator Wallop from the legislative history, 3 Leg.
Hist. 532, Senate Debate, Dec. 5, 1977).
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the Corps granting dredge and fill permits. 85 Though exercised rarely,
many believe the EPA's veto power has a tremendous effect on all
section 404 permit decisions. 86 This could signify an increasing impact
of section 404 on state water rights, since the EPA's five most recent
vetoes have all involved public water projects. 87 A 1994 case highlights
the regulatory power of the EPA under section 404. In James City
County v. EPA, the Fourth Circuit Court upheld an EPA decision to veto
a section 404 permit for a municipal water supply reservoir. The court
held that the EPA's veto was valid even if based on purely environmental
concerns, without regard for the county's water needs. 88
Plaintiffs in many of the cases challenging both EPA and Corps
decisions have an uphill battle because they must usually show the
agency's action was "arbitrary and capricious [or] an abuse of discretion. " 89 This is a difficult standard of review for any plaintiff to
meet. 90

B.

Section 404 Permit Denials and Regulatory Takings Claims

Some landowners and water rights holders have attempted to limit
section 404's effect on private rights by claiming that the denial of a
section 404 permit constitutes a taking of property without compensation
contrary to the Fifth Amendment. 91 Since at least 1922 the Supreme
Court has recognized regulatory takings-cases in which regulation of
property becomes so severe that a property interest is infringed upon and
compensation must be paid. 92 But claims that section 404 permit denials
constitute a regulatory taking have been largely unsuccessful. 93 Beck
notes that, "courts faced with the [takings] question in the section 404
context have found either minimal depreciation of the property or no
depreciation resulting from the denial of the permit. These cases
emphasize the idea that a property owner is not guaranteed the highest

85. See Ellis, supra note 57.
86. /d. at 64-65.
87. /d. at 64.
88. James City County v. EPA, 12 F.3d 1330, 1335 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 87 (1994).
89. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(A) (1986).
90. See, e.g., James City County, 12 F.3d at 1337-39.
91. See Want, The Taking Defense to Wetlands Regulation, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 10, 169 (1984).
92. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
93. Smithwick v. Alexander, 673 F.2d 1317 (4th Cir. 1981); Jentgen v. United States,
657 F.2d 1210 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); Deltona Corp. v. United
States, 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982).
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and best use of property. " 94 The few successful takings claims based
on a permit denial have involved a valid pre-existing land use disallowed
by the imposition of the section 404 permitting program. None of them
has involved a claim for the taking of a water right. 95
In 1992 the Supreme Court revisited the regulatory takings question
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 96 Justice Scalia articulated
the general rule in this case by stating that " [w]hen the owner of real
property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses
in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking. "97 The requirement that all
beneficial uses be destroyed by the state action precludes most takings
claims under section 404. But the question remains as to whether water
rights holders under a prior appropriation scheme have a valid claim.
Courts generally hold that water rights are vested rights in western
states; 98 if federal regulations under Clean Water Act section 404
prohibit use of a water right, the right holder may have a takings claim
against the government. 99
However, even if a water right holder could prove he or she had
been denied all economically beneficial uses ofthe water, a second hurdle
must be overcome to prove a taking. Courts have long recognized a
nuisance exception to the general rule of takings, by which governments
may forbid harmful uses of property under their police power. In Lucas
the Court narrowed this exception to cases in which the regulation "does
not proscribe a productive use that was previously permissible under
relevant property and nuisance principles. " 100 To explain how this rule
would work, Scalia writes "the owner of a lake bed, for example, would
not be entitled to compensation when he is denied the requisite permit to
engage in a landfilling operation that would have the effect of flooding
others' land." 101 This would seem to put section 404 permitting within
the nuisance exception to takings claims, but by limiting the exception to

94. Beck, supra note 8, at 572.
95. 1902 Atlantic, Ltd. v. Hudson, 574 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Va. 1983); 1902 Atlantic
Ltd. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 575 (1992); Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 31 Env't.
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1835 (CI. Ct. 1990); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 31 Env't.
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1847 (CI. Ct. 1990); Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332 (1992). But
see Ciampitti v. United States, 32 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1608 (CI. Ct. 1990); Dufau v.
United States, 32 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1524 (CI. Ct. 1990).
96. 112 S.Ct 2886 (1992).
97. !d. at 2895.
98. Zachary L. McCormick, Interstate Water Allocation Compacts in the Western United
States-Some Suggestions, 30 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 385, 394 (1994).
99. !d.
100. 112 S. Ct. at 2901.
101. !d. at 2900.

340

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 10

common law principles of nuisance, the Court apparently excluded
exceptions to the takings law based on modern congressional notions of
harmful activities. 102
In the case of wetlands regulation, the common law would thus
uphold Corps permit decisions intended to protect against such hydrological threats as undue flooding or erosion, but might not find a nuisance
exception in Corps decisions and EPA vetoes aimed at protecting against
ecological threats. This may leave section 404 permit denials open to
takings claims when they are made in the interest of environmental and
other more esoteric values associated with wetlands.
Especially
vulnerable may be decisions such as the EPA's veto of the Ware Creek
municipal water development project, which was justified on purely
environmental grounds. 103
Some commentators have questioned
whether the Lucas decision would apply to takings claims for natural
resources since these resources are generally controlled by federal law
rather than by common law. 104 But water is an exception. It is still
controlled by state law and might therefore be subject to regulatory
takings claims, at least in western states .105 However, in general it
remains true that section 404 does not easily lend itself to takings claims
for water rights. 106
Whether one chooses to characterize section 404's impact on state
water law as "minimal" or "excessive," it is undeniable that conflicts
between state law and wetlands protection under section 404 have
generated abundant litigation. The case law growing out of the Clean
Water Act's section 404 has only exacerbated the fears of most state
water rights holders and their advocates.

102. /d. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[The majority's emphasis] on the common
law of nuisance is too narrow a con tine for the exercise of regulatory power in a complex and
interdependent society. The State should not be prevented from enacting new regulatory
initiatives in response to changing conditions, and courts must consider all reasonable expectations, whatever their source.").
103. James City County v. EPA, 12 F.3d 1330 (4th Cir. 1993). This particular case
probably would not give rise to a takings claim because it took place in Virginia and involved
a riparian water right. However, if the Corps or the EPA follow this case in the West, the
regulatory takings question may arise.
104. See COGGINS, supra note 4, at 249-51.
105. See Fallini v. Hodel, 963 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1991).
106. But see TARLOCK, supra note 29, at§ 9.06[1] (arguing that "[a] severe curtailment
of an existing right could be a compensable taking," but admitting that "most challenges will
fail because they are not ripe or the federal government has sufficiently accommodated the state
right").
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HOW FEDERAL WETLANDS PROTECTION AFFECTS STATE
WATER ALLOCATIONS UNDER INTERSTATE COMPACTS

[Ojn cool August nights you can hear their whistled signals as [the
young plovers] set wing for the pampas, to prove again the age-old
unity of the Americas. Hemisphere solidarity [and interstate solidarity}
is new among statesmen, but not among the feathered navies of the
sky. 101

A.

The Interstate Compact

Because the waters of most rivers are not confined within the borders
of any one state, and because water law is predominantly state law,
conflicts over the allocation of interstate streams are particularly difficult
to resolve. Various methods of resolving interstate water disputes have
evolved, but it is generally conceded that the most effective means of
allocating water between states is the interstate compact. 108
Congress can allocate the waters of interstate streams, but it has done
so only rarely and with, at best, mixed results. 109 Statutory allocation
is not ideal, first because it takes the issue completely out of the hands of
the states, and second because a congressional statute gives the allocation
such permanence and force that inequities or outright stupidities written
into the law are almost impossible to remedy. 110 Gratefully, statutory

107. LEOPOLD, supra note 1, at 38.
108. Jerome C. Muys, Allocation and Management of Interstate Water Resources: The
Emergence of the Federal-Interstate Compact, 6J. INT'L L. & Pot!Y 307, 311 (1976); George
W. Sherk, Resolving Interstate Water Conflicts in the Eastern United States: The ReEmergence of the Federal-Interstate Compact, 30 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 397, 406 (1994).
109. See Boulder Canyon Project Act, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928), 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617t
(effecting a statutory apportionment of the waters of the Colorado River between Upper Basin
states (Colorado, Utah, Wyoming) and Lower Basin states (Arizona, California, Nevada));
Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 101-618, 104 Stat.
3295 (1990) (apportioning the rights of the Truckee River Basin between California, Nevada,
and federal interests represented by the Pyramid Lake band of the Paiute Nation).
110. The Boulder Canyon Project Act was "intended to put an end to the long-standing
dispute over Colorado River Waters." Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 560 (1963).
Instead it was the foundation for a whole new line of cases with names that sound like PAC
10 football matchups. Arizona v. California, is just one instance.
Another recent example of the drawbacks inherent in statutory apportionment has come
with the growth of Las Vegas. Because the Boulder Canyon Project Act allocates water from
the Colorado River but not its tributaries, Las Vegas may be forced to construct a diversion
from the Virgin River at enormous waste and expense and at the jeopardy of an endangered
species, the Virgin River Chub. If not for the terms of the statutory apportionment, Las Vegas
could "wheel" the same water through Lake Mead at a fraction of the cost. See Ryan Dennett,
Las Vegas and the Virgin River: Cashing in on a Jackpot in the Southern Desert 28-31 (Dec.
16, 1994) (unpublished student paper, on file at the J. Reuben Clark Law School Library).
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allocation has been used only when states are completely unable to reach
a satisfactory agreement on their own. 111 Judicial solutions, including
adjudication or litigation before the Supreme Court, tend to be equally
slow and possibly more expensive. 112 The Supreme Court's hesitancy
to involve itself in fractious interstate water controversies is understandable, and the Court has acknowledged that litigation is really a fairly
blunt instrument unsuited for the extremely complex factual considerations, changing circumstances and unique local issues that interstate
water allocation requires. 113
Allocating interstate water rights through compacts has numerous
advantages, two of which Felix Frankfurter and James Landis recognized
in 1925. 114 First, because the negotiation process that leads to the
adoption of a compact is unconstrained by strict legal rules, compacts
permit parties to reach a mutually beneficial "sensible compromise"
outside the adversarial context of the courtroom. 115 Second, compacts
are more versatile and better able to adjust to changing circumstances
than a judicial decision allocating water rights could ever be. 116 This
is particularly true of water compacts, since many compacts-nearly twothirds of the existing apportionment compacts-provide for the creation
of a perpetual compact commission to administer the agreement. 117
Third, the establishment of compacts helps stabilize ownership rights in
the water of interstate streams, making investment less risky and thus
providing for the full development of interstate water resources. 118 In

111. Both the Boulder Dam Project Act and the Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water
Rights Settlement Act were passed only after literally decades of negotiations were unable to
bring the various parties to an agreement.
112. GETCHES, supra note 46, at 402-03; Muys, supra note 108, at 310-11.
113. In Nebraska v. Wyoming the Court bemoaned the inadequacy of the judicial system
to resolve interstate water controversies:
[T]hese controversies between the States over the waters of interstate streams "involve
the interests of quasi-sovereigns, present complicated and delicate questions, and, due
to the possibility of future change of conditions, necessitate expert administration
rather than judicial imposition of a hard and fast rule. Such controversies may
appropriately be composed by negotiation and agreement, pursuant to the compact
clause of the Federal Constitution. We say of this case, as the court has said of
interstate differences of like nature, that such mutual accommodation and agreement
should, if possible, be the medium of settlement, instead of invocation of our
adjudicatory power."
325 U.S. 589, 616 (1945), cited in Muys, supra note 108, at 310-11.
114. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 24.
115. !d. at 706 (quoted in Grant, supra note 21, at 552).
116. !d. at 701, 707 (also quoted in Grant, supra note 21, at 552).
117. Grant, supra note 21, at 559 (citing Carver, Interstate Compacts Appendix, in NEW
SOURCES OF WATER FOR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH: INTERBASIN TRANSFERS
(Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado School of Law, June 7-10, 1982).
118. See Grant, supra note 21, at 573.
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the cases of the Colorado River and the Snake River, Congress made the
establishment of an interstate agreement a precondition to its funding the
development of the river. 119

B.

Recent Challenges to Interstate Compacts

Recently, however, some have questioned the ability of interstate
compacts to accomplish the ends that Frankfurter and Landis found so
valuable. 120 The development of the federal reserved rights doctrine, 121 and increasing federal regulatory power over the nation's waters-environmental regulations in particular-have created a serious
challenge for many interstate water compacts. A good example of such
a challenge is the Clean Water Act's section 404 permitting program.
Because interstate compacts usually incorporate state water law in
their allocations, section 404's impacts on individual water rights also
affect water allocation under interstate compacts. Water users in an upstream state may be forced to let their allocation run by their land and out
of the state, thus upsetting not only their plans and expectations, but also
the balance achieved between states by compact.
In only one reported instance has wetlands preservation under section
404 of the Clean Water Act interfered with the water allocation of an
interstate compact. 122 One of the arguments raised by the Colorado
irrigation company in Riverside was that the section 404 permit denial
would prevent Colorado from diverting and using the water allocated to
it under the South Platte River Compact. 123 The district court held that
Congress has the power to enact legislation that conflicts with and
overrides a prior compact, even if its effect is to alter interstate water
compact allocations. 124 But Judge McKay's circuit court opinion specifi-

119. /d.; see also Charles J. Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1, 48
(1966) (suggesting that "[m]ost compacts" were negotiated in an effort to obtain "federal
benefits ... contingent upon agreement being reached"); Blaine Cannon, The Snake River
Compact: Facing an Uncertain Future, 2 (Dec. 16, 1994) (unpublished student paper, on file
at the J. Reuben Clark Law School Library) (noting that the Snake River Compact was
negotiated after the federal government made it a prerequisite to any federal funding for
construction of the Palisades dam) (citing Letter from R.J. Newell, Federal Representative,
Snake River Compact Commission, to R.F. Bessey, Chairman, Pac. Northwest Field Committee, Department of the Interior 2 (Dec. 13, 1949) (copy on file with Blaine Cannon).
120. Tarlock, supra note 59, at 24-25.
121. See United States v. Winters, 207 U.S. 564 (1908); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S.
546 (1963). See LEONARD RICE & MICHAEL D. WHITE, ENGINEERING ASPECTS OF WATER
LAW 108-11 (1987) (discussing the development of the federal "reserved rights" doctrine).
122. Riverside Irr. Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (lOth Cir. 1985).
123. 758 F.2d at 513-14. It has been suggested by some commentators that the invocation
of the ESA and § 404 was simply a device used by Nebraska farmers to circumvent the
interstate allocation under the agreement. Tarlock, supra note 59, at 20.
124. 758 F.2d at 589-90.
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cally refuses to address the question of compact preemption and finds for
the Corps on other grounds. 125
That congressional legislation can supersede an interstate compact
seems consistent with the theory of interstate compacts. 126 Felix
Frankfurter and James Landis argue that when giving congressional
approval to interstate compacts:
Congress does not surrender any of its powers; it merely finds no
occasion for its present exercise of them. There is, therefore, no
"delegation" of its power in any legally significant use of the term. But
Congress does not foreclose the future. If and when circumstances
which now call for solution through compact change, Congress is
wholly free to assume control. 127
Although it has been argued that Congress should be bound by an
interstate compact it ratified, the Supreme Court answered the question
unequivocally in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co. : 128
"Clearly not. Otherwise Congress and two states would possess the
power to modify and alter the Constitution itself. " 129
The Wheeling decision specifically precluded enforcement of the
compact when its effect would have limited Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause; it does not necessarily mean that all compacts are
preemptable. However it probably does mean that water allocation
compacts can be preempted, since the Supreme Court's decision in
Sporhase v. Nebraska 130 clearly makes state water rights subject to
congressional control under the negative commerce clause. 131 One must
assume that an interstate compact provides little protection for state water
rights against congressional interference. 132 Dan Tarlock explains:
[S]tate interests recognized in a compact may be subject to federal
policies articulated after the compact was negotiated. The federal
government has the power to apportion interstate waters, and therefore
no state rights are vested against federal apportionment. Any state
water rights, be they based on state law or an interstate compact,

125. Riverside Irr. Dist. v. United States, 758 F.2d 508, 514 (lOth Cir. 1985) ("[A]
decision on the question of the impact of the interstate compact would be premature.").
126. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 24, at 685.
127. !d. at 726-27.
128. 59 U.S. 421 (1855).
129. Id. at 433.
130. 458 U.S. 491 (1982).
131. Tarlock, supra note 59, at 24.
132. Grant, supra note 21, at 556.
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therefore remain subject to subsequent diminution by Congress, if
Congress decides to use this power. 133
Though traditionally deferential to state water law, Congress could
preempt state law under the Commerce Clause. The Riverside decisions
indicate that water allocations under congressionally approved interstate
compacts "may not be as firm as they were once thought to be. " 134
Interstate compacts lacking congressional approval, like the compacts
between California and Nevada allocating the water of the Truckee River
in the Reno-Tahoe area, are even less reliable. These compacts are
subject not only to congressional preemption, 135 but also to the regulations of federal agencies. 136
Ultimately, the question of whether federal wetlands regulation
significantly burdens state water rights is largely academic; any interference with state rights is important to the extent that landowners and water
rights holders think it poses a threat to their rights. The perceived threat
of a section 404 permit denial creates something analogous to a cloud on
private title to water rights. Good water policy should recognize that the
threat itself, despite, or even because of, the fact that it is exaggerated,
may significantly impact the efficient development of water resources.
The threat of regulatory interference decreases the value of state water
rights insofar as potential developers think the threat is real.
What is the solution to this difficult problem? Reducing federal
regulation of state water under section 404 is not the answer. Even if
Congress could be persuaded to amend section 404, or if the courts could
be persuaded to read the statute more narrowly-and they have made it
emphatically clear that they have no such intention-an effort to
circumvent wetlands protection would be counterproductive.
As
frustrating as it may be to private developers faced with a section 404
permit denial, wetlands represent a valuable and increasingly rare national
treasure, well worth the price of their protection. Instead of trying to
circumvent federal regulations or have them repealed, lawyers and state
water administrators should direct their efforts toward creating the

133. Tarlock, supra note 59, at 25.
134. /d.at24n.119.
135. See Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 101618, 104 Stat. 3294 (1990), discussed in Charles Harlow, If At First You Don't Succeed:
Resolving Water Quality Issues in the Lake Tahoe Basin Through Interstate Allocation and
Regional Development Compacts 12 (Dec. 16, 1994) (unpublished student paper, copy on file
at the J. Reuben Clark Law School Library).
136. E.g., Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir.
1984) (upholding a decision of the Secretary of the Interior requiring the release of storage
water intended for municipal use in order to maintain sufficient water levels in Pyramid Lake
to preserve the endangered lahontan cutthroat trout).
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maximum amount of stability in water rights while allowing for the
possibility of federal interference with those rights. This Comment
supports the proposition that interstate compacts, or more particularly,
federal-interstate compacts, create one of the best opportunities to achieve
this end.
V.

AN INTERESTS-BASED APPROACH TO WETLANDS PROTECTION

Industrial landowners and users . . . are inclined to wail long and
loudly about the extension of government ownership and regulation to
land, but ... they show little disposition to develop the only visible
alternative: the voluntary practice of conservation on their own lands.
When the private landowner is asked to perform some unprofitable act
for the good of the community, he today assents only with outstretched
palm. If the act costs him cash this is fair and proper, but when it costs
only fore-thought, open-mindedness, or time, the issue is at least
debateable. 137

A.

Is Federal Regulation Really Necessary?

It has been suggested that perhaps the best way to protect state and
local water rights and land use from federal wetlands regulation is to put
the permitting program in the hands of the states .138 In fact, subsections (g) through (i) of section 404 139 provide for state administration
of the program upon approval by the EPA, but because the Corps must
retain jurisdiction over actually navigable waters, this amounts to only a
partial delegation of federal authority, and only one state, Michigan, has
chosen this route. 140 Some argue that federal standards should be
relaxed to facilitate state administration of the program, but there are
good reasons for preserving federal control over the section 404
permitting process. Many of the values represented in wetlands are
federal and interstate in nature. 141 Historically, state and local water
users have tended to ignore interstate and national interests in wetlands
preservation and have pursued their own interests in development. 142
As a result, the federal government has assumed many of the functions
necessary to protect these vital ecosystems. 143

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

LEOPOLD, supra note
TRELEASE & GOULD,

1, at 50.

supra note 48, at 760; see also Sanderson, supra note 19.

33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(g)-(i) (1988).
49 Fed. Reg. 39,012 (1984).
Wood, supra note 56, at 10-11.
!d. at 11.
!d.
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The interested parties

State regulatory commissions that administer interstate compacts and
states that contemplate drafting interstate water compacts need to be
aware of the possibility that water rights allocated under interstate
compacts may be disrupted by federal environmental regulations,
including wetlands regulation under section 404. For an interstate
compact to be truly effective it must be comprehensive-that is, it must
deal with all aspects of water regulation within the river system. 144
This means the agreement should cover groundwater 145 and atmospheric
water, 146 as well as surface water. It also means that compacts should
recognize and address water quantity and water quality issues, as well as
related environmental interests. An interstate compact cannot pretend to
be comprehensive unless it addresses federal rights-both reserved rights
and regulatory powers such as those administered under section 404 of
the Clean Water Act. New interstate compacts should be drafted and
existing compacts should be amended to provide maximum stability to
individual water rights while preserving the equitable allocation of water
among compact states. These provisions must be broad enough to deal
both with the effects of current regulatory programs such as section 404,
and with the possibility of future environmental legislation that may
disturb what states and individuals presume to be their settled water
rights.

2.

The compact solution

The question then arises, how can an interstate compact that is itself
subject to federal regulation mitigate the effects of that regulation on state
water rights and interstate allocation? It is the thesis of this Comment
that the most effective way to stabilize water rights is through federal-

144. McCormick, supra note 98, at 392-94.
145. According to Douglas Grant, only three interstate compacts currently deal with
groundwater resources at all. They are (1) the Amended Bear River Compact arts. V(A),
VI(B), 94 Stat. 4, 10-11 (1980); (2) the Kansas-Nebraska Big Blue River Compact art. V(5.2),
86 Stat. 193, 196-97 (1972); and (3) the Upper Niobrara River Compact art. VI(A), 83 Stat.
86, 89 (1969). Grant, supra note 21, at 556-57. However, both of the federal-interstatecompacts "treat groundwater on a par with surface water." /d.; see Delaware River Basin Compact
§§ 1.2(i), 3.3(a), 10.1, Pub. L. No. 87-328,75 Stat. 688,690,692,699 (1961); Susquehanna
River Basin Compact§§ 1.2(9), 3.3, 3.4(2)-(5), 4.2(a), 10.1, 11.1 to 11.5, Pub. L. No. 91575, 84 Stat. 1509, 1511, 1513, 1514, 1515, 1518, 1523, 1524, (1970).
146. No current compact mentions atmospheric water resources, Grant, supra note 21,
at 556, but a model state law compact on weather modification has been written and is
supported by the American Society of Civil Engineers. RAY lAY DAVIS, FUTURE LEGAL
REGULATION OF WEATHER MODIFICATION (1988).
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interstate compacts, compacts between two or more states and the federal
government. 147 By making the federal government a party to a compact, water allocation and development decisions can be coordinated from
the beginning with federal interests in mind, rather than having state
allocations and individual expectations disrupted by a section 404 denial
or an EPA veto in the later stages of a development plan. 148 Furthermore, while the federal government is unlikely to fully abandon its
regulatory powers to an interstate commission, 149 a federal-interstate
compact commission could provide state water administrators an
opportunity to participate in the federal regulatory process.
The federal-interstate compacts now in existence have been roundly
praised by commentators and have more than fulfilled the expectations of
the signatory states. 150 The principle model of a successful federalinterstate compact is the Delaware River Compact, signed by Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware. 151 It resulted in the
creation of a powerful compact commission, with broad regulatory
powers over all aspects of the water within the basin, including power to
allocate the waters of the river. 152
The Delaware River Compact was successfully used as the model for
the Susquehanna River Compact. 153 However, these compacts involve
only eastern states and deal mostly with water quality issues rather than
water quantity or allocation. Some question whether the federal-interstate
model would work in the more arid western states. 154 State governments in the West tend to mistrust the federal government and are
especially resentful of federal power over natural resources such as water.
Zachary McCormick argues that western states have traditionally been
very stingy both in funding interstate compact commissions and in the
delegation of state sovereignty to those commissions. He maintains that
western states would therefore be unlikely candidates for the kind of
broad-ranging federal-interstate compacts that have been so successful in
the East. 155 Western intransigence is admittedly an obstacle to the

147. TRELEASE & GOULD, supra note 48, at 620-22, gives a good explanation and a short
history of the development of federal-interstate compacts.
148. Muys, supra note 108, at 324-25.
149. TRELEASE & GOULD, supra note 48, at 622.
150. Muys, supra note 108, at 313-14.
151. Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961).
152. !d. at 692-93.
153. Susquehanna River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 91-575, 84 Stat. 1509 (1970); see
Sherk, supra note 108, at 402-03 (1994) (citing SUSQUEHANNA RIVER BASIN COMMISSION,
PUBLIC FORUM: THE SRBC COMES OF AGE-21 YEARS OF SERVICE TO WATER USERS OF THE
BASIN (1992)).
154. McCormick, supra note 98, at 394.
155. !d.
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federal-interstate compact, but not an insurmountable one. In fact, there
is no reason why a federal-interstate compact could not work in the West
as well as it has worked in the East, and in many ways the peculiar
conditions of western politics and the western climate make the federalinterstate compact solution particularly suited to the west. 156
The abiding mistrust of western landowners and political leaders may
make the negotiation of federal-interstate compacts more difficult, but this
is no reason to dismiss the possibility entirely. The mistrust of all things
federal can be overcome; for as westerners are fond of saying, "we may
be dumb but we're not stupid. " 157 Even westerners will accept a
federal-interstate compact they think is fair, especially if they believe the
compact is the best way to protect state water rights.
But first, western water rights holders must be dispossessed of any
quixotic delusions of resurgent federalism and states' rights. 158 Despite
what many westerners may think, the overwhelming consensus of the
legal community is that Congress has ample power under the Commerce
and Supremacy Clauses of the Constitution to simply occupy the field of
water allocation and preempt state law altogether. 159 This may seem
like a political impossibility at this point, especially considering the
elections of November 8, 1994, but Congresses come and Congresses go;
the environment is here to stay. 160 If states continue to ignore federal
interests, especially environmental interests, the political tide may quickly
turn against them. 161 Clearly state governments would be well-advised
to learn to compromise with the federal government on water uses.
Interestingly, Jerome Muys suggests that the federal-interstate compact
is a desirable solution particularly in the West because the federal
government already has such powerful rights and interests in water
allocation. 162 State participation in the federal process can only increase
a state's influence over largely discretionary agency regulatory decisions.

156. Muys, supra note 108, at 311; see also Olen Paul Matthews, Judicial Resolution of
Transboundary Water Conflicts, 30 WATER RESOURCES BULL., 375, 382 (1994).
157. I wish I could cite convincing authority for this proposition, but unfortunately,
examples from natural resources law tend to prove just the opposite. I will just have to assert
it on my own authority, which, as a Utahn, may be suspect.
158. See Muys, supra note 108, at 325.
159. MacDonnell, supra note 61, at 411; Muys, supra note 108, at 315; Tarlock, supra
note 59, at 24-25; Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 24, at 726-27.
160. At least we hope so. If it does go away we will not be far behind.
161. While commentators have been warning states for years that the their persistent
failure to recognize federal interests could result in federal preemption of state water law, the
Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 101-618, 104 Stat.
3295 (1990), is a current case in point. See Harlow, supra note 135, at 12-15.
162. Muys, supra note 108, at 311.
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Another objection raised to federal-interstate compacts is the fear that
federal agencies will not be willing to participate in negotiations that will
place limitations on their currently unquantified, and thus unlimited water
rights under the reserved rights doctrine and various regulatory programs. 163 Paul Bloom suggests that Congress should enact legislation
forcing all agencies with reserved claims on certain streams to quantify
those claims so the rest of river can be allocated under state law. 164 In
effect, this would create a de facto federal-interstate compact.
Zachary McCormick has criticized this approach as going too
far. 165 McCormick argues that rather than make the federal government a signatory party to an interstate compact, compacts should merely
contain a provision requiring the federal agencies to recognize, with
certain reservations, the interstate allocation and state water law. 166
This approach has been used before on the Republican167 and Belle
Fourche River Compacts, 168 approved in 1943 and 1944 respectively,
and McCormick suggests that the same approach should be used to
protect state water interests today. 169 However it seems unlikely that
even a conservative Republican Congress would countenance such broad
restrictions on federal power in the 1990s. Most of the older interstate
compacts are "so environmentally outdated" that Congress probably
would not approve a similar agreement today. 170
This point is illustrated by the interminable negotiations over the
Truckee River Compact.
Congress rejected proposed compacts
containing provisions similar to those in the Republican and Belle
Fourche River Compacts that would have limited federal interference with
state water law. 171 Although the compact was drafted in cooperation
with a representative of the federal government 172 and was ratified by

163. McCormick, supra note 98, at 393.
164. Paul Bloom, Law of the Range: A Critique of an Extraordinary Legal System, in
NEW COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER 139 (Gary D. Weatherford & F. Lee Brown eds.,
1986), in McCormick, supra note 98, at 393.
165. McCormick, supra note 98, at 393.
166. /d. at 394.
167. Republican River Compact, Pub. L. No. 60, ch. 104, 57 Stat. 86 (1943) (between
Colorado, Kansas, and Nebraska).
168. Belle Fourche River Compact, Pub. L. No. 236, ch. 64, 58 Stat. 94 (1944) (between
South Dakota and Wyoming).
169. /d.
170. Sherk, supra note 108, at 406, (quoting Jerome C. Muys, Approaches and
Considerations for Allocation of Interstate Waters (forthcoming 1994)).
171. John Kramer, Lake Tahoe, the Truckee River, and Pyramid Lake: the Past, Present
and Future of Interstate Water Issues, 19 PAC. L.J. 1339, 1363-64 n.101 (1988).
172. /d. at 1364.
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both Nevada and California, 173 Congress did not ratify it because it
failed to adequately address federal water rights in the Truckee River
basin. 174 The particular federal rights in question were Indian reserved
rights claimed by the Paiute tribe, and water to protect threatened and
endangered fish species in Pyramid lake. Such values were of little
concern when the compact was first drafted in the early 1960s. But by
the time the compact was finalized, Indian rights and species protection
were important political issues, and Congress would not approve it. 175
Since 1971, California and Nevada have been unsuccessful in
obtaining congressional approval of the Truckee compact. 176 Ironically,
in 1979 Secretary of Interior Cecil Andrus suggested the adoption of a
federal-interstate compact for the Truckee River Basin modeled on the
Delaware River Basin Compact. 177 The states rejected this option, so
ultimately Congress imposed its own water allocation statute in 1990. 178
The history of the Truckee River suggests that modern interstate
compacts that attempt to coerce federal recognition of state water rights
might not obtain the necessary congressional approval.
The Truckee River history shows one reason states should negotiate
federal-interstate compacts, but it does not necessarily provide a reason
for federal agencies to negotiate. Ultimately, a congressional mandate
forcing federal agencies to co-operate with state and local agencies in
quantifying federal reserved rights may be necessary. But a one-time
quantification such as Bloom suggests may be inadequate to protect
federal interests; for example, compact negotiators can not foresee all of
the effects of potential water developments on current or future endangered species. 179 Instead, an ongoing system of oversight and coopera-

173. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 538.600 (Michie 1986); CAL. WATER CODE§ 5976
(West 1971).
174. Kramer, supra note 171, at 1364-67.
175. /d. at 1367.
176. /d. at 1371-76.
177. See Pyramid Lake Paiute and Truckee River Settlement Act of 1985: Hearings on S.
1558 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Public Lands, Reserved Water, and Resource
Conservation of the Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., at 277-81
(letter from Cecil D. Andrus to James T. Mcintyre, Director, Office of Management and
Budget (May 25, 1979)) [hereinafter Andrus], (quoted in Kramer, supra note 171, at 1370
n.124).
178. Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 101-618,
104 Stat. 3295 (1990). See Harlow, supra note 135, at 12-15.
179. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (danger to snail
darter species discovered after construction of Tellico Dam was under way). It is impossible
for biologists to know enough about where and how all endangered species live to quantify
their water appropriation needs in advance. Biological inquiries are usually not undertaken
until a project is proposed and the process is triggered by the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(l)
(1988).
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tion between the federal government and the states is needed. 180 For
water regulation under the Clean Water Act, the legislation coercing
federal participation in such a system may already be in place.
The Wallop Amendment states that "the authority of each State to
allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded,
abrogated, or otherwise impaired," 181 and that "nothing in this chapter
shall be construed to supersede or abrogate rights to quantities of water
which have been established by any State." 182 Both imperatives are
qualified by language characterizing them as merely "the policy of
Congress. " 183 But Congress did not similarly qualify the concluding
language of the statute, which commands unequivocally that "[f]ederal
agencies shall co-operate with State and local agencies to develop
comprehensive solutions to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution in
concert with programs for managing water resources. " 184 States may
be able to compel federal participation and cooperation in compact
negotiations under the Wallop Amendment.
An observation made by George Sherk pertaining to the Delaware
River Basin Compact suggests a final argument for federal-interstate
compacts in the West. Sherk noted that existing federal-interstate
compacts have helped redefine the relationship between the federal
government and member states in positive ways. 185 Because it allows
the various state and federal agencies an opportunity to meet and work
through problems in a setting of cooperation rather than competition, the
federal-interstate compact may actually reduce animosities and tensions
between member states and the federal government. One does not want
to pin too many expectations on a single agreement, but anything that
might help redefine the relationship between federal and state governments in the West should be pursued. Sherk suggests that the model
interstate stream compact being prepared by the American Society of
Civil Engineers should be a federal-interstate compact. 186 The rest of
this Comment explores the ways an interstate or federal-interstate
compact might address the problem of federal wetlands protection and
state water rights.

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Muys, supra note 108, at 324-25.
33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (1988).
/d.

/d.; see also supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
/d. (emphasis added).
Sherk, supra note 108, at 406.
/d. at 406-07.
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A Wetlands Protection Proposal for Interstate and FederalInterstate Compacts

Wetlands protection under section 404 of the Clean Water Act
provides an excellent example of how an interstate or federal-interstate
compact might resolve the conflict between federal regulation and state
law. Successful resolution of the wetlands question may suggest ways to
resolve other state-federal water rights conflicts. One of the aspects of
interstate compacts that Frankfurter and Landis praised was the ability to
creatively resolve conflicts not easily addressed by strict application of
legal principles. 187 This means that interstate and federal-interstate
water commissions could work to achieve compromises between
competing interests rather than simply choosing one interest over the
other as often happens in the judicial setting.
Clearly some kind of equitable compromise is needed to address the
wetlands preservation issue under section 404 of the Clean Water Act.
Such a compromise should evaluate the problem in terms of who bears
the cost, and who benefits from the various wetlands values that the
particular policy either protects or allows to be developed. Federal
regulation of private water rights under section 404 has often been
justified by the fact that wetlands preservation serves interests that are
interstate, national, or in the case of some environmental protection
measures, international in scope. 188 However, local and state interests
usually stand to gain more by developing wetlands than by protecting
them, at least in the short term. 189 If wetlands are to be saved at all,
they will be saved by those who recognize an interstate or national
interest in their preservation and are relatively disinterested in local
development projects. Clearly, wetlands have received far greater and
more effective protection under federal authority than they would under
exclusively state laws. 190
However, a state prevented from diverting its share of interstate
waters, or an individual who loses the ability to develop private water
rights based on interstate or national interests should not have to bear the
full brunt of the loss. By arguing that federal protection is necessary to
protect wetlands, conservationists acknowledge that wetlands regulation
serves national and interstate interests at the expense of local and intrastate interests. If the benefits claimed by wetlands protection are in fact

187.
188.
189.
190.

Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 24, at 706.
Wood, supra note 56, at 10-11.
!d. at 11.
Beck, supra note 9, at 548-51.
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interstate and national, the costs should not be all intrastate and local. To
the extent that all states in the basin or drainage area benefit from the
protection of wetlands on interstate streams, all should share in the cost
of protecting them. To the extent that the nation as a whole profits from
environmental benefits of wetlands protection, the federal government
should share in the costs of that protection. But so far, courts have been
hesitant to characterize wetlands preservation as a "taking" or to impose
the costs of compensation on the federal government. To do so would
make the cost of wetlands preservation prohibitive, thus defeating a clear
congressional imperative and possibly resulting in the permanent loss of
many of our greatest national treasures in exchange for an increased
number of mini-malls.
This Comment suggests two possible compact provisions aimed at
resolving conflicts between state water allocation and federal wetlands
protection. The first (see Appendix 1) is a simple measure designed to
equitably distribute the burden of wetlands protection between states when
that protection affects water allocations under interstate compacts. 191
The second, (see Appendix 2) is a more comprehensive and ambitious
approach and requires the cooperation of the federal government. This
suggestion attempts to get at the root of the problem-the instability of
state water rights in light of federal wetlands protection. 192

1.

Federal burdens on interstate streams: sharing the costs

When wetlands preservation policies result in a section 404 permit
denial that affects interstate water allocation, this is a determination made
in the interests of flood protection and water quality enhancement that
benefits all the states that use the water of that stream. The burdens
therefore should be shared proportionally among the states instead of
falling exclusively on the state where the permit was denied. This burden
apportionment could be accomplished through a simple provision in most
interstate compacts and need not involve the federal government. 193
Interstate water compacts should provide that when the federal
government prevents a state from diverting water allocated to it by
interstate compact to protect downstream wetlands, each state's allotment
should be reduced accordingly. This principle could be applied generally
to federal interests in state water, though perhaps not as well for federal
Indian reserved rights, which serve local citizens and state interests. The
idea of sharing the burden of federal interests between states is not new.

191. See Appendix 1: Model Interstate Compact Wetlands Provision, infra.
192. See Appendix 2: Model Federal-Interstate Compact Wetlands Provision, infra.
193. See Appendix 1, infra.
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The Department of Interior, in comments on the provisional draft of the
Truckee River Compact submitted to federal agencies in 1965, "recommended that federal uses of water be a claim on the entire interstate
stream system and not be charged only against the allocation of the state
where the uses are made. " 194
This proposal recognizes that interstate interests such as water
quality, wildlife, flood protection, and resource conservation are often
synonymous with federal interests. It would also provide a disincentive
to states that hope to circumvent interstate compact allocations by
manipulating federal environmental protection statutes or lodging spurious
environmental claims. 195 States whose own allocation will be reduced
by a section 404 permit denial in an upstream state will be less likely to
argue for federal water rights on an interstate stream.

2.

A national interest in state resources: compensating private parties

Federal-interstate compact commissions are in a unique position to
fairly balance the burdens incident to wetlands protection. The Model
Federal-Interstate Compact Wetlands Provision suggested by this
Comment should be understood as merely one way in which federalinterstate compact commissions could address the problem of stabilizing
state water rights against the threat of federal regulation. No compact
presently in existence dabbles in the minutiae of federal regulatory
decision-making to the extent that the proposed compact provision does.
Perhaps these suggestions are better suited for service in the by-laws of
a federal-interstate compact commission than as part of the compact itself.
The key here is that only a federal-interstate compact can provide the
kind of versatility that would allow parties to reach the most equitable
and creative solutions to their water-use conflicts.
For instance, when a local use is sacrificed for a national interest, the
federal government should compensate landowners and holders of water
rights for the reasonable value of water "condemned" to wetland
uses. 196 This approach to wetlands protection is also not without
precedent. Similar measures providing for the purchase of "conservation
easements" have been included in the federal "swampbuster" incen-

194. Kramer, supra note 171, at 1365 (citing Andrus, supra note 177).
195. See Tarlock, supra note 59, at 20 (suggesting that the litigation in Riverside
Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp. 583 (D. Colo. 1985), "arose when Nebraska discovered that downstream irrigators on the Platte River could be better protected under the wing
of the endangered whooping crane than by litigating the allocation of the river under interstate
compacts and the doctrine of equitable apportionment").
196. See Appendix 2, infra at III.l.(b).
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tives, 197 in state wetlands preservation statutes, 198 and in the TruckeeCarson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act. 199
Federalinterstate compacts should contain provisions requiring compact members
to negotiate a reasonable rate of compensation that could be applied
uniformly without resort to legal condemnation proceedings?00
Thus far, judicial resolution has created a situation in which no one
comes out ahead except the lawyers and one or two lucky plaintiffs. In
most instances compensation is denied, but when landowners obtain a
"regulatory taking" ruling, it can be extremely expensive for the
government. 201 Federal-interstate compacts can work out solutions to this
problem that are fair to both sides. A compact commission could
establish a "condemnation" price for wetlands conservation easements in
which landowners and water rights holders would not get the full value
of the land or the water right put to its highest economic use. Instead,
they would be compensated at some considerably lower rate-perhaps a
rate analogous to the cost of the unimproved land.
Through a federal-interstate compact, the costs of wetlands protection
could be shared equitably among the interested parties. The principles
guiding this compensation should reflect the interests of the various
parties. 202 All the wetlands values to be considered in Corps decisions
would be allocated among the parties according to whose interests are
protected. 203 The interests of each compact member would be represented by different categories of wetlands values, and each party to the
contract might be allotted a certain number of points to "bid" for those
values it wanted represented in the Corps decision. 204 For example,
endangered species protection might be more in the national interest and
less in the interest of states. Other interests might be shared by several

197. Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624,
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat. 3359) §§ 1431, 1438-40, 1461-63 (amending 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1231, 3831, 1001-09); see also Johnson, supra note 3, at 319 (praising the acts for
"appealing to farmers who must survive economically," and for "finally placing inherent value
on the land to ensure a public benefit for the nation").
198. See Chown, Protecting Wetlands with Conservation Easements, GREAT LAKES
WETLANDS, Spring 1990. at 3, col. 1, cited in Beck, supra note 8, at 553.
199. Pub. L. No. 101-618, 104 Stat. 3295 (1990), quoted in Harlow, supra note 136, at
12.
200. See Appendix 2, infra, at III.l.(b).
201. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 31 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1847 (Cl. Ct.
1990) ($2.5 million compensation awarded for section 404 permit denial). But see Florida
Rock Indus. v. United States, 31 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1835 (Cl. Ct. 1990) ($1 million
award for regulatory taking caused by § 404 permit denial), vacated by Florida Rock Indus.
Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (1994).
202. See Appendix 2 infra part II.1.(a)-(b).
203. See Appendix 2 infra part II.2-3.
204. See Appendix 2 infra part Il.2.
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parties. Wildlife protection might be partly in the federal interest and
partly in the interest of the states. Protection of fish and game wildlife
within a state might be worth more to the state than protection of species
outside the state. States might even sell part of their bid allotment to
private developers or divide it among agencies or competing special
interest groups within the state. If local landowners' interests are best
represented by development values, they can pay to have those values
represented in the Corps' decision. The final decision would still rest
with the Corps, 205 but this decision also would have to be represented
by a bid. 206
The significance of the bid is that it represents not only the right to
have one's interests represented, but also the responsibility to pay for
those benefits that are in one's interest. If the Corps decided to deny a
permit application, it would be required to justify its decision by
providing a breakdown of its rationale in terms of the values the decision
was meant to protect. 207 Landowners and water right holders affected
by permit denial would be compensated, but the cost of compensation
could be readily divided among the federal government and any other
parties with interests represented in the decision. 208 The costs of
protecting each value represented in the Corps' evaluation would be
allocated among the parties according to their bids. On the other hand,
decisions to develop a wetland would require indemnification to offset the
cost of wetlands mitigation and maintenance from the local landowner or
other parties with interests represented in that decision?09 The details
of the compensation plan would have to be worked out by the members
of the compact and would be renegotiated at regular intervals. 210 The
compensation plan would contain a formula to guide the commission in

205. This can be assured by allotting the federal representative a majority of the points
and permitting them to bid after all other parties have made their bids. See Appendix 2 infra
part II.2.(a)-(c).
206. See Appendix 2 infra part III.
207. See Appendix 2 infra part III.l.(a).
208. See Appendix 2 infra part III.l.(b)(i)-(ii).
209. See Appendix 2 infra part III.2.(b)(i)-(ii). Oliver Houck suggests that a three to one
ratio is necessary because of the uncertain success of artificial wetlands, and because of the
need to restore wetlands already lost. While I agree that a three to one ratio is desirable and
even necessary to restore the massive amount of wetlands already lost, it does not seem fair
to require those seeking a permit today to pay for the losses of the past two hundred years.
A two to one mitigation ratio would prevent further wetlands losses, taking into account the
uncertainty involved in wetlands mitigation efforts. The costs of wetlands restoration should
be shared by the nation as a whole. Oliver A. Houck, Hard Choices: The Analysis of
Alternatives Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and Similar Environmental Laws, 60
U. COLO. L. REV. 773, 838-39 (1989).
210. See Appendix 2 infra part III.l.(b).
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determining which parties were responsible for compensation and for how
much.
Compensating landowners for wetlands preservation may be less
expensive to the government than defending itself in a takings situation,
and landowners and water rights holders will not go uncompensated for
their lost expectations. By establishing a fixed rate of compensation,
legal costs to both sides can be avoided. By keeping the compensation
rates low, the government can protect itself against spurious developers
who buy wetlands and then look for a windfall by claiming a loss of
beneficial use. Furthermore, anyone who acquired wetlands after either
state or federal wetlands legislation was in place should be estopped from
arguing that the legislation took away the value of developing their land
or water right. 211
The federal government should be safe from takings claims under
this compact provision for the same reasons that it is safe today, 212 but
it will enjoy the added protection of having paid a reasonable amount for
lost potential uses. By compensating landowners who cannot develop
their wetlands, the government insures against the possibility of having
to defend itself in various takings actions. The money saved by
eliminating such takings claims could probably pay the compensation rate
for the approximately 500 dredge and fill projects that are denied each
year. 213
VI.

CONCLUSION

Like winds and sunsets, wild things were taken for granted until
progress began to do away with them. Now we face the question
whether a still higher 'standard of living' is worth its cost in things
natural, wild, and free. For us of the minority, the opportunity to see
geese is more important than television, and the chance to find a
pasque-flower is a right as inalienable as free speech. 214

To the degree that wetlands preservation protects the interests of all
the water users on an interstate stream, states should equally share the
burden of that protection. Interstate compact commissions are in a
unique position to oversee the reallocation of waters among compact
states incident to a section 404 permit denial that affects interstate water
allocation.

211. Appendix 2 infra part Il.l.(b).
212. See supra discussion accompanying notes 90-106.
213. See Wood, supra note 56, at 54-55.
214. LEOPOLD, supra note 1, at xvii.
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If we truly believe that wetlands protection is in the national interest,
then we must continue to look for less burdensome ways of protecting
them, and the cost of that protection should be shared by the nation as a
whole-that is, by the federal government. If we are unwilling to share
the cost of protecting wetlands, then perhaps wetlands protection is not
as much in the public interest as Congress has presumed it to be. I
believe the American people have recognized the value of wetlands
protection and are willing to pay for it. Wetlands are a national treasure
well worth the price of their preservation. However, we should not
expect farmers and the water users to bear the full burden of benefits
enjoyed by the whole nation. Federal-interstate compacts can provide
various and dynamic methods of reallocating these costs.

Erik G. Davis
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1: MODEL INTERSTATE COMPACT WETLANDS PROVISION

I. Federal water uses within the Basin shall be considered a claim on
the entire interstate stream system and shall not be charged to the
allocation of the state where the uses are made.
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2: MODEL FEDERAL-INTERSTATE COMPACT WETLANDS
PROVISION

I.

COMPLIANCE WITH STATE AND FEDERAL WETLANDS LAWS. No
provision of this compact and no agreements reached under this
compact shall be construed in any way to excuse or reduce the
liability of any party or their duties to comply with all applicable
state and federal laws and regulations for the purpose of wetlands
protection and preservation.

II.

BIDDING ON THE WEIGHT OF EVALUATION FACTORS. As part of the
Public Interest Review required under 33 C.P.R. § 320.4 and the
Evaluation required by § 404(b)(l) of the Clean Water Act, the
United States Army Corps of Engineers shall take and weigh the bids
of all state parties to the Compact before approving or denying a
proposal under § 404 of the Clean Water Act.

1.

WETLANDS VALUES.
For each project that comes before the
commission, the compact commission shall prepare two lists of
wetlands values, one listing the values represented by the proposed
development, and one listing those values threatened by the project.
(a) EVALUATION CRITERIA. These values shall include but shall not
be limited to those wetlands functions important to the public and
private interest as set forth in the laws of states party to the compact
and the United States Army Corps of Engineers' General Policies for
Evaluating Permit Applications.'
(b) ADDITIONAL VALUES. Other values associated with wetlands and
deemed to be of particular relevance to the proposal at hand may be
added to the lists by any party to the compact. Parties to the
compact may also remove any values from the lists that they deem
to be irrelevant to the proposed project as long as no other party
objects to the removal. The identities of those moving to add values
to or remove values from the lists and the identities of parties objecting to removal shall be secret.

1. "All factors which may be relevant to the proposal must be considered including the
cumulative effects thereof: among those are conservation, economics, aesthetics, general
environmental concerns, wetlands, historic properties, fish and wildlife values, flood hazards,
flood-plain values, land use, navigation, shore erosion and accretion, recreation, water supply
and conservation, water quality, energy needs, safety, food and fiber production, mineral
needs, considerations of property ownership." 33 C.P.R. § 320.4(a).
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2.

BIDDING. Each project application that comes before the Commission shall be subject to an evaluation by the compact parties. Each
party to the compact shall be allotted a certain number of "points."
A party may use these points to "bid" for those values of particular
concern to the party. Bidding shall be done according to the
following procedural rules:
(a) ALLOCATION OF BID POINTS TO THE FEDERAL REPRESENTATIVE.
The bid allocation of the federal representative shall be no less than
51 points.
(b) ALLOCATION OF BID POINTS TO STATE PARTIES. The combined
bid allocation of the all the state parties to the compact shall be no
more than forty-nine points, divided equally among state parties to
the compact, with a remainder of one point to the state in which the
action is proposed. 2
(c) BIDDING PERIOD. The federal representative shall designate a
time after which no bids may be received. This time shall be after
the Public Notice, Comment Period, Public Interest Review, and
Evaluation Period required by the statute and regulations, but it shall
be before the acceptance or denial of the application. Bids shall
remain open and subject to change by the parties until the designated
time. The federal representative shall bid after all state bids are
received.

3.

(a) BIDS. Each bid shall consist of two parts:
(i) an allocation of points for and/or against the proposal; and
(ii) a justification or allocation of points among one or more of the
wetlands values contained on the lists promulgated pursuant to
section II .1. The total of points bid by any party may not surpass
the party's bid allotment as determined in subsections 11.2(b) or
11.2(c).
(b) OPEN AND CLOSED BALLOTS. During the bidding period the tally
of points bid both for and against the proposal shall be public
information. However, the allocation of points bid towards each of
the listed values shall remain secret until all state parties have bid.
The federal representative shall bid after all state parties have bid.

2. Thus if there are two state parties to the compact, the state in which the project is
to be constructed would be allotted 25% of the state bid and the other party would be allotted
24%. If there were three state parties to the compact, the "home" state would get 17% of the
state bid, and the other states would get 16% each. If there are four state parties the allocation
is 13% to the "home" state, 12% to the rest. If the number of states in the compact is 5, 7,
9, 10, or any other number that leaves a remainder of more than one, then the percentage of
the bid allotted to the states can be adjusted. For example, five states would divide the bid
such that the "home" state got 10% and the other four got 9.75% each.
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(c) ABSTENTIONS. Any party to the compact may abstain from
bidding on an application with the following exceptions:
(i) The federal representative may not abstain from bidding unless it
is shown by substantial evidence that the project will involve no
adverse impact to any wetlands functions important to the public
interest as delineated in 33 C.P.R. § 320.4(b). 3
(ii) State parties may not abstain from bidding unless it is shown by
substantial evidence that the proposed project will produce no
adverse impact to wetlands values protected by statutes of that
state.
(iii) Any party that adds a new value to either list shall be required
to allocate a given percentage of its points to that value.
III. PROJECT APPROVAL OR DISAPPROVAL. All projects requiring the
discharge of dredge and fill materials in the navigable waters of the
Basin shall be subject to review and approval by the federal
representative from the Corps of Engineers as required by section
404(b) of the Clean Water Act (U.S.C. § 1344(b)). This review
shall conform to the requirements of 33 C.P.R. § 320.4(3), in that
the specific weight of each factor for or against the proposal shall be
determined and reflected in the bid of the federal representative.
1. PROJECT DISAPPROVAL. If the total of points bid by all parties
against the proposed project is greater than the total of points bid for
it, the project shall be disapproved and the § 404 permit denied.

3. Wetlands considered to perform functions important to the public interest under this
section include:
(i) Wetlands which serve significant natural biological functions, including food chain
production, general habitat and nesting, spawning, rearing and resting sites for aquatic
or land species;
(ii) Wetlands set aside for study of the aquatic environment or as sanctuaries or
refuges;
(iii) Wetlands the destruction or alteration of which would affect detrimentally natural
drainage characteristics, sedimentation patterns, salinity distribution, flushing
characteristics, current patterns, or other environmental characteristics;
(iv) Wetlands which are significant in shielding other areas from wave action, erosion,
or storm damage. Such wetlands are often associated with barrier beaches, islands,
reefs and bars;
(v) Wetlands which serve as valuable storage areas for storm and flood waters;
(vi) Wetlands which are ground water discharge areas that maintain minimum
baseflows important to aquatic resources and those which are prime natural recharge
areas;
(vii) Wetlands which serve significant water purification functions; and
(viii) Wetlands which are unique in nature or scarce in quality to the region or local
area.
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When a permit for any project is denied, a Memorandum of
Rationale shall be prepared by the commission identifying and
quantifying the reasons for the permit denial.
a. MEMORANDUM OF RATIONALE. The Memorandum of Rationale
shall reflect the bids of all the parties that opposed the proposal, and
shall contain the following:
(i) An enumeration of specific wetlands values threatened by the
proposed project as set forth in section 11.1.
(ii) A percentage-based quantification of the weight given to each
wetlands preservation value by the parties bidding to deny the
permit. 33 C.P.R. § 320.4(a)(3).
b. COMPENSATION TO PRIVATE LANDOWNERS AND WATER RIGHTS
HOLDERS. Every five years, or at any interval agreed to by the
parties to this compact, the Commission shall establish a fixed and
uniform rate of compensation for landowners and water rights
holders who acquired the property or water right that is the subject
of the permit application before applicable state or federal wetlands
preservation statutes were enacted and who are denied the full use of
their property because of a section 404 permit denial.
(i) Compensation shall be based on the present value of the land or
water right, but need not represent the highest economic use of the
property.
(ii) The cost of compensation shall be divided among those parties
that opposed the project in proportion to their bids for wetlands
values listed as threatened by the proposed project.
2.

PROJECT APPROVAL. If the total of all bids in favor of the proposed
development is greater than those opposed, the Corps of Engineers
shall approve the project. Whenever any project in the Basin is
approved, and before actual work in the Basin is permitted to take
place, the Commission shall prepare a Memorandum of Rationale
identifying and quantifying the reasons for the permit approval.
a. MEMORANDUM OF RATIONALE. The Memorandum of Rationale
shall reflect the bids of all the parties that favored the proposal, and
shall contain the following:
(i) An enumeration of specific wetlands values served by the project
as set forth in section II .1.
(ii) A percentage-based quantification of the weight given to each
wetlands development value by the parties bidding to approve the
permit. 33 C.P.R. § 320.4(a)(3).
(iii) A showing, by substantial evidence, that the project will not
adversely affect any listed wetlands value, or
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(a) plans showing how adverse impacts to wetlands will be
minimized, and
(b) plans showing how any loss of wetlands area or values will be
mitigated, including the cost of mitigation.
b. WETLANDS MITIGATION. Wetlands acreage shall be mitigated at
a ratio to be decided by the commission but not less than three acres
of new wetlands of equal or greater biological productivity shall be
created for every acre of wetlands destroyed or seriously impacted
by the project.
(i) Before actual work on any approved project begins wetlands
mitigation as required and agreed upon by the commission
pursuant to subsection III.2.b. shall be accomplished. If the
parties to this compact agree that work on the project should be
permitted to begin immediately, a bond shall be posted sufficient
to accomplish complete mitigation as required by this compact.
(ii) The cost of the mitigation project or the cost of the bond shall be
divided among those parties that bid in favor of the project in
proportion to their bids in favor of the project.

